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The Future of Warfighting: Cyber Enabling Convergence

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How the joint force can achieve overmatch in conflict

The speed and complexity of U.S. full-spectrum cyber operations has grown exponentially since 2016 when it took months to coordinate Operation Glowing Symphony—U.S. Cyber Command’s (CYBERCOM) first large-scale action to take down the global networks of ISIS. This watershed use of CYBERCOM’s authorities and processes for offensive cyber operations set the stage for today’s persistent engagement with adversaries. In fact, the joint force now operates at an unrivaled rate in all warfighting domains. But winning future conflicts will require even greater agility. Fleeting targets will likely give joint force commanders and operators mere minutes to decide whether and how to act.

The decisive advantage in future conflict will go to the side that can operate with greater precision, speed, and effectiveness. This is a clear lesson from the Russia-Ukraine war, future trends, and years of experience commanding and readying forces for battle.

At all levels, U.S. and partner forces must synchronize and integrate kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to generate concurrent effects across all domains faster and more effectively than the enemy. This is what the U.S. Army calls “convergence”—and achieving it will be a critical differentiator for U.S. and allied forces in future conflict. It will enable the joint force to maintain information and decision advantage; preserve command, control, and communications systems; and ensure critical detection and targeting operations. Full-spectrum cyber forces will play a vital role in achieving convergence. And cross-domain experiments like Arcane Thunder are a step in the right direction. Meanwhile, strategic competitors have similar ambitions.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are contesting U.S. superiority in all domains with investments in anti-access and area denial, cyber, combat robotics, and direct/indirect fire. By 2049, the PRC wants a “world-class military"—with a core operational concept of “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare” that uses big data and artificial intelligence (AI) to rapidly pinpoint U.S. operational vulnerabilities for kinetic and non-kinetic strikes across all domains. Russia’s abysmally poor performance in Ukraine indicates it has much work ahead, but catastrophic failure often incentivizes urgent innovation.

Why Cyber Is Crucial for Convergence

To outpace adversaries, the joint force must treat networks and operator infrastructure as the foundational weapon system for the Department of Defense (DOD), and treat data as a form of ammunition, mindful that intelligence drives operations. In addition, the force must build greater awareness of its own capabilities and vulnerabilities, as well as those of the adversary, while also tracking all other relevant actors, actions, and activities.

Cyber forces will be essential enablers of convergence—provided DOD unlocks their potential. Right now, for instance, U.S. military commanders responsible for making decisions about how to allocate resources and plan operations often need greater insights into the options that full-spectrum cyber capabilities provide for accomplishing crucial missions. DOD needs training and exercises across full-spectrum operations with cyber fully embedded. Simply “white carding” cyber—the common practice of using a note to simulate cyber operations—is insufficient.

How Cyber Forces Enable Convergence

1. Operate and defend

the networks, data, and weapon systems that enable joint force to see itself, see the adversary, and see the other relevant actors, actions, and activities in the operations and information environments at misson-relevant speed

2. Simultaneously attack

adversary networks, data, and weapon systems to disrupt adversary command and control and degrade their capacity to intergrate and synchronize multidomain capabilities

3. Synchronize and integrate

their efforts in conjunction with the intelligence community, the interagency, foreign partners, conventional forces, and increasingly with special operations and space forces

A Blueprint for Achieving Convergence

  • Target warfighting problems with data
  • Prioritize warfighting networks and infrastructure
  • Reimagine decision tools and processes
  • Empower the Army’s triad for special operations forces (SOF), space, and cyber forces 

Target Warfighting Problems with Data

Data is a form of ammunition for an information age military. Because DOD is so reliant on data for warfighting it must also ensure data sets, algorithms, and the networks that assure data flow are protected with quantum-resistant encryption; robust access controls; and scalable zero trust, enterprise cross-domain solutions.

DOD should leverage cyber forces’ deep technical knowledge and experience with large data sets to inform and accelerate efforts to adopt a data-first approach, prioritize uses of AI and machine learning (ML) to solve the most important warfighting problems, and proactively conduct data preparation of the operating environment.

  • DOD is awash in data from myriad sources of differing security classifications, data types, and formats, and therefore is challenged to share, normalize, and rapidly and accurately extract value from that data to drive decisions and action at the scale and speed required. The exponential increase in the velocity, variety, and volume of data on the future battlefield threatens to overwhelm decision processes and decision makers by inducing cognitive breakdown instead of enabling cognitive overmatch.

  • DOD must proactively conduct data preparation of the operating environment. The National Security Strategy identifies and prioritizes urgent threats. This analysis should inform intelligence collection, weapon requirements, force development, and data requirements. Failure to identify, collect, develop, and secure data sets and AI/ML algorithms required to enable key decisions and support joint targeting places the joint force at significant risk.
  • Internal disputes—about who owns data, for instance—must not eclipse urgent efforts to provide commanders with insights they need. Otherwise, the joint force might deny itself the ability to instantaneously neutralize fleeting targets across multiple domains.

  • DOD must strive to achieve convergence of sensor data while reducing cognitive load to the operator—and to train and equip the operator with tools that empower decision making.

Prioritize Warfighting Networks and Infrastructure

DOD networks, operator infrastructure systems, and the data that flows across them are the foundational weapon system for an information age military. Networks unite sensors, weapons, decision makers, and U.S. partners and enable shared awareness, decisions, and actions. Adversaries understand that the U.S. military’s decisive advantage is not only its weapons and tactics overmatch, but its ability to synchronize kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities globally at mission-relevant speed.

In the future, adversary cyber, electronic warfare (EW), and kinetic operations will actively contest the use of the electromagnetic spectrum as well as traditional military and commercial networks and space capabilities. Cyber forces understand what is required to operate and defend warfighting and support networks and assure adequate data flows.

DOD must transform how it designs, acquires, operates, and defends the networks and operator infrastructure that connect the joint force and U.S. partners. Also, DOD must develop viable primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plans to assure data flows for critical warfighting functions.

  • DOD networks are stovepiped by classification, service, functional, geographic, and weapon systems considerations. All of this creates exceptional complexity, seams, expense, and operational risk. DOD must urgently transform how it designs, acquires, operates, and defends its foundational weapon system to succeed in a denied, disrupted, intermittent, and limited bandwidth (DDIL) operating environment. Significant efforts must be undertaken to secure weapon systems, industrial control systems, and the ever-increasing operational technology (OT) across DOD from kinetic and non-kinetic attacks.

  • In the meantime, the department must develop and resource viable PACE communications plans to ensure critical data flows. Effectively integrating a variety of commercial technologies and leading practices to include more successful use of cloud computing and storage, software-defined networking, Kubernetes, 5G, and in the future, 6G technologies and the broad array of nanosatellite capabilities being deployed around the globe will immediately improve network resiliency and assured flow for critical data.

  • As DOD pursues its flagship effort to integrate all domains—Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2)—the department should explore integrating in the Joint Cyber Command and Control (JCC2) capability, which is intended to provide situational awareness, battle management, and cyber forces’ management for full-spectrum cyber operations.

  • Consistent with the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency's (DARPA) vision for “mosaic warfare,” the Army should assess whether the joint force is making headway toward achieving a “kill web” that combines the power of a comprehensive network of sensors with a network of options to defeat battlefield targets.

Reimagine Decision Tools and Processes

DOD must reimagine its tools and processes to enable the joint force to make faster, better decisions with superior outcomes. Solving data and network challenges will have minimal effect if the joint force lacks the decision aids and the realistic training required to identify and seize convergence opportunities.

War in the future will remain a human endeavor, and humans at all levels are under the increasing stress of persistent surveillance, increased weapons lethality, misinformation, disinformation, and having to process an exponential increase in data from countless sources to feed faster decision cycles. This underscores the need to enhance the cognitive abilities of U.S. forces.

Achieving cognitive overmatch will require DOD to develop new processes, techniques, and tools to effectively employ AI, ML, and other decision aids. Cyberspace operations are inherently data centric and cyber forces must effectively leverage realistic simulations, digital mission rehearsals, and cyber ranges to build the sets and reps required to operate, defend, and attack at mission-relevant speed.

Although the quality of education and training across the joint force is the best in the world, it fails to adequately replicate the complexity, scale, persistence, data flow, speed, and perhaps most importantly the cognitive overload of the future battlefield. DOD’s operational testing directorate has specifically called out the need for increased training in contested cyber environments.

To achieve convergence, DOD must reimagine joint force education and training, develop rapidly tailorable decision aids and visualization, and field hyper-realistic simulations and exercises spanning all domains.

  • The first step is to finalize the joint doctrine for all-domain operations and then build the training required to underpin the doctrine, especially how to most effectively use networks and data to drive decision making, action, and assessments. Joint training should focus more on realistic warfighting scenarios, especially cross-functional integration of joint capabilities and should feature realistic all-domain-capable adversaries. The adage of a pint of sweat in training saves a gallon of blood in combat is apropos. Education and training with foreign partners are especially important so we can reduce the friction that can arise from language and culture.

  • The complexity inherent in convergence demands decision and visualizations aids that are truly joint, are threat informed, and allow the individual user to rapidly configure to support their decision making. These aids should be able to be trained in live, virtual, and constructive exercises and operations.

  • A combination of hyper-realistic live, virtual, and constructive training simulations and capabilities will allow multiple repetitions with scenarios involving the loss of critical capabilities due to kinetic or non-kinetic adversary actions. Scenarios should include multiple enemy courses of action, faithful models of adversary capabilities, and the challenges presented by culture, language, climate, and geography. The critical factor is the ability to train decision makers and those who are responsible for carrying out the actions that are directed. Ranges with emitters, hardware in the loop, and high-fidelity networks with realistic data sources are important to rehearse information operations, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum effects, and actual kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Where possible, actual AI and ML models should be trained and exercised in these simulations. 

Empower the SOF-Space-Cyber Triad

SOF, space, and cyber forces share responsibility for supporting or operating in all domains, providing asymmetric capabilities, operating in contested or denied areas, and conducting or supporting information operations. The SOF-space-cyber triad is a new doctrine that integrates and synchronizes the capabilities and operations of these forces.

From gray zone operations short of conflict to large-scale contingency operations, each of the forces may conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), direct action, and enabling foreign partners. SOF may provide access for cyber forces to defend forward, while cyber forces may provide capabilities for SOF to access non-permissive or denied areas, or space forces could enable SOF and cyber forces with access or intelligence of special communications capabilities.

The integration of these forces provides the joint force with a broad menu of asymmetric capabilities. DOD should prioritize resourcing the triad, accelerate operational use cases, and develop the special technologies and training required to fully optimize the triad.

  • DOD should resource SOF, space, and cyber forces to effectively operate together—and with the joint force as a whole—using common tools and technology.

  • DOD should develop policies and operational use cases for employment of the full range of capabilities inherent to the triad. SOF, space, and cyber capabilities can access denied areas through other domains to conduct intelligence, influence, and effects operations. The triad enables the joint force to fight the close fight, provide support from sanctuary, and project influence at the tactical and global levels.

  • DOD should develop and resource special technologies and training capabilities such as digital ranges, hyper-realistic simulations, and covert communications. These are required to train and develop an operational force capable of conducting multidomain operations utilizing unique SOF/space/cyber capabilities. These forces must be trained to operate in both integrated and independent scenarios across the spectrum of permissive/non-permissive and contested/non-contested environments.

On the future battlefield against peer and near threats possessing robust all-domain capabilities, achieving effective “convergence” of non-kinetic and kinetic capabilities across all domains faster and more effectively than U.S. adversaries will be the single most important capability and asymmetric advantage for the U.S. and its allies. DOD must fundamentally reimagine and change its processes, capabilities, training, and employment. 

Cyber forces will play a leading and outsized role on the future battlefield. They will be required to operate and defend joint force networks, data, and weapon systems enabling the joint force to achieve cognitive overmatch. At the same time, they will be required to attack adversary systems to degrade and disrupt their ability to effectively integrate and synchronize all-domain capabilities. The SOF-space-cyber triad must receive the authorities, resources, and capabilities to accelerate the asymmetric advantages it promises. 

Meet the Author

Click to view Stephen Fogarty
Stephen Fogarty

 

 

Stephen Fogarty is a senior leader with Booz Allen’s National Cyber account. With extensive cyber, intelligence, and information technology (IT) experience, Stephen helps lead the development of threat-informed defensive and offensive cyber strategies and solutions to support our U.S. government and international mission partners.

Winning matters, and DOD must ruthlessly drive the outcomes that assure winning on the future battlefield.

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Cyber Strategy Cybersecurity Defense Intelligence Technology Civil Government

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